In 1961, in its Mapp v. Ohio ruling, the Supreme Court declared that every state must exclude from criminal trials evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the "exclusionary rule." At the time the Court issued its ruling, twenty-four states allowed ill-gotten evidence in their criminal trials, and twenty-four excluded it. Commentators who have looked only at the cases in which evidence is actually excluded have found that there is little impact of the rule. The economic model of the search warrant process predicts an increase in crime rates after the Court forced states to adopt the exclusionary rule as police officers substitute away from searches towards alternatives they consider less effective. Our empirical analysis supports these theoretical predictions. A statistically and economically significant increase in crimes followed the Court's enactment of the exclusionary rule, ranging from 3 percent increases in larceny to 30 percent increases in assault. The major impact of this ruling was on smaller cities. In addition to the Mapp v. Ohio ruling, we also examined two other major rules imposed on the states by the Court. These are the rule granting indigent defendants the right to counsel, imposed in the Gideon v. Wainwright ruling of 1962, and the Miranda v. Arizona ruling of 1966, granting the right to remain silent and have an attorney present during questioning. While the effects are not as large as those of Mapp v. Ohio, these two rulings also increased crime rates in those states affected by the new rules.
. This paper incorporated all changes in criminal procedure into a weighted proxy, which was introduced as an explanatory variable in a multipleequation system to explain movement in national crime rates over three decades. The analysis supports the proposition that criminal procedure is a significant determinant of criminal behavior, but, as we show, a much more detailed analysis is possible. In contrast, economics journals are filled with extensive empirical analysis into the effect of changes in punishment, conviction rates, clearance rates, unionization, gun control, and various socio-economic factors on criminal behavior. 4 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . 5 372 U. S. 335 (1963) . 6 367 U. S. 643 (1961) . 7 Several others have examined empirically the effect of criminal procedure on police productivity and criminal behavior, although not on crime rates. (April, 1998. ) Cassell found a dramatic decrease in confessions when Miranda was enacted. Professor Cassell's studies rely upon both regression analysis and investigation of crime statistics. Because Miranda was enacted by the Supreme Court, and there were no states that had voluntarily enacted a similar rule, the analysis is complicated by the possibility that a uniform shock to the criminal justice system occurred simultaneously with the Court's decision and is responsible for the changes. However, his analysis suggests that the radical transformation models of criminal behavior have ignored this aspect of the system, instead focusing upon the detection and sentencing phases of the process.
Although recent changes in criminal procedure have been marginal, the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court that we examine were radical shifts in the criminal justice system. These rulings allow us to test the economic theories of criminal behavior in the context of changes in criminal procedure. Of the Supreme Court cases mentioned, the Table 1 .) This creates a control group to be used in the statistical analysis. It is a perfect example of a "natural experiment." 8 Second, the exclusionary rule established in Mapp has been debated vigorously, both in the past, when the controversial decision was made, and in the present, with Congress recently considering altering the exclusionary rule. 9 Changing this rule was also part of the "Contract with America." 10 Finally, much of the importance of the other procedural rules stems from Mapp. For example, the possibility of excluding evidence from trial greatly augments the value and impact of the Fifth Amendment's right to counsel. 11 For these reasons, this study will focus primarily on the predicted and actual effect of the exclusionary rule on crime rates.
The rational choice model of criminal behavior predicts that if the Mapp ruling did affect the behavior of police-altering either the probability of conviction or detectionthen citizens should respond by increasing their level of unlawful activity. Since the exclusionary rule increases the costs of police investigations, the police will respond by substituting away from those activities that require a warrant towards those that do not.
in criminal procedure had a large impact upon police productivity, as seen by the dramatic change in violent crime clearance rates. 8 See Bruce D. Meyer, "Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics," 13 Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 151 (April) . 9 Jarett B. Decker, "The 1995 Crime Bill: Is the GOP the Party of Liberty and Limited Government?," 229 POLICY ANALYSIS 20 (June 1995) . 10 Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, editors, Contract with America, Times Books, New York, 1994, pp. 52-53. 11 For some non-obvious and interesting implications of alternative procedural rules, see William J. Stuntz, "The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice," 107 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1 (October 1997). For example, Stuntz argues that it is cheaper to contest procedural than factual claims, so that the system will be biased towards disputing procedural issues and away from examining factual matters.
As this change in police behavior is understood by the criminals, they too alter their behavior. The theoretical impact on crime rates due to the exclusionary rule is therefore expected to be positive as the decisions by judges affect the police and, eventually, criminals.
This prediction is supported by the data. The evidence reveals a significant impa ct on crime rates following the involuntary adoption of an exclusionary rule as the penalty for an unlawful search and seizure. This finding is dramatically at odds with current academic and judicial beliefs regarding the impact of the exclusionary rule. This finding is similarly in conflict with numerous older studies of the Mapp ruling, studies that failed to detect any significant adverse effect. These studies, however, generally overlooked the effect of the exclusionary rule on the decisions of the investigator and the criminal, focusing instead on the decisions of the prosecutor and the trial judge. As a measure of the cost and effect of the exclusionary rule, the older studies examined the number of cases thrown out or lost at Ohio ruling had on the criminal justice system in 1961. The host of studies performed in the late 70s examined the contemporary system, looking at the number of suspects released or the time spent on evidentiary issues to determine the cost of the exclusionary rule.
The studies of the late 70s and early 80s are ultimately responsible for the widely held belief that the exclusionary rule has little effect on crime rates in the United States. 21 These studies focused upon the number of cases lost at trial, and generally discovered that the percentage of cases lost due to an exclusionary issue was small. From this research, the judicial and political community presumed that there were few repercussions on the crime rate because few criminals were released. But this assumption overlooks the significant secondary effects of the exclusionary rule. If the exclusionary rule changes the behavior of police and alters the probability of apprehension, then the rational choice model predicts an increase in the number of crimes committed. Thus, the police may adhere to the exclusionary rule and commit fewer illegal searches, but an important secondary effect might be fewer crimes investigated, as the police weigh the benefits of investigating a crime against the costs involved. • Adding together data from all stages of the felony process, the cumulative loss from illegal searches ranges from 0.6% and 2.35%.
• In felony arrests for offenses other than drugs and guns, the number of illegal searches is lower.
• 2.3% of drug cases are screened out and the total cumulative loss ranges from 2.8% to 7.1%.
From these and other findings, the special committee wrote: "the conclusion that the exclusionary rule neither causes serious malfunction of the criminal justice system nor promotes crime is strongly supported by practically all of our . . . witnesses and by our telephone survey results." 24 This characterizes the mainstream academic opinion of the exclusionary rule-proponents agree that the exclusionary rule deters the police but consider a possible effect on criminals preposterous and irrelevant. Of course, these small numbers of excluded cases are quite consistent with a world in which the police adapt to the exclusionary rule and use alternative methods of obtaining evidence. Since police are being forced to use alternatives that are less preferred than search, we would expect the result to be higher crime rates, even if few or even no cases are ultimately lost at trial because of illegally obtained evidence.
We first provide a more formal theoretical model of this process. We then set forth an empirical analysis to test this theory.
III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS 25
In the search warrant process there are three major participants: the judge, the police, and the criminal. The basic analysis here assumes that each player is rational, When a cr ime is committed, evidence E is generated, which is sufficient to convict the criminal with probability Pc. But the police cannot directly observe this evidence until they search the suspect. An important distinction between a search and a sample carries through the entire model. A search occurs when the police get a warrant and search for evidence. A sample occurs when the police draw a signal about a suspect guilt without conducting a search. What is observable from a sample without search is a signal of guilt.
One signal, S h , is more likely to be seen when the suspect is guilty; the other, S l , when innocent. These signals may be interpreted as an alibi, the criminal's arrest record, witness testimony, or any other indication of guilt or innocence that can be observed without searching the suspect. The signals, S i , of the evidence level have the following distribution:
Each period, the police draw an additional signal, which are all independently distributed (with a constant cost c), or go to the judge and get a warrant (with cost s). If the police obtain the warrant, they search the suspect and observe the incriminating evidence. The police suffer a cost, w, when they search an innocent man, and they suffer a cost K(b) when they fail to catch a criminal. We assume K(b) is increasing in b, the Manuscript, Emory University, Department of Economics 1998.
benefits from the criminal act. This assumption reflects the idea that the general public and the higher governmental officials who control the police budget impose a cost on the police for not capturing a criminal. Given these costs and benefits of starting an investigation, the police must determine an optimal stopping rule for this sequential sampling problem that minimizes the net cost of investigating a crime.
Solving for the expected number of samples and the probability that a criminal will be caught becomes problematic as the number of suspects increases. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there are two suspects for each crime, one of whom is the criminal. 26 The police must then decide whether or not to start an investigation and, if an investigation is started, which suspect will be searched first. But since the courts set the level of evidence necessary for a search, the police must first meet the probable cause requirement as determined by the warrant-issuing judge. This requirement does not preclude the police from sampling further, if the expected cost of continued sampling is less than the cost of searching the current suspect.
In each period the police begin with a belief about each suspect's guilt, and an expectation of future signals. An optimal stopping rule chosen by the police will establish a critical belief about a suspect's guilt where the expected cost of continuing to sample is just equal to the benefit from additional information. Wald 27 proposed one method to determine the boundaries of the optimal stopping rule when the sampler may continue sampling indefinitely. His method, called the sequential probability ratio test, was created to address the possibility of multiple exclusive hypotheses. In this case, there are two hypotheses: H1, suspect one is guilty, and H2, suspect two is guilty.
Let S i represent an observation that has probability f 1 (S i ) under H 1 and f 2 (S i ) under H 2 . Further, let ρ be the police's belief that hypothesis one is true. Then a critical region can be defined { γ ,δ} such that if ρ > δ then accept H 1 ; if ρ < γ then accept H 2 ; and if γ < ρ < δ then continue sampling. At each stage, an additional observation is drawn that 26 This assumption could be replaced to allow for the possibility that the criminal is not included within the suspect group. A simple model incorporating this idea would postulate a fixed probability P that the criminal is a suspect. But this would muddy the analysis without changing any of the results. and sampling is stopped if ρ i is outside the critical range.
In order to calculate the expected number of samples, given a critical region ( γ,λ),
it is convenient to re-define the signals received, such that S i =1 if the signal that period is high, and S i = -1 if the signal is low. The sum of signals, ∑S j , is a sufficient statistic for the police's belief about suspect 1's guilt, and the critical region is redefined to determine the bounds on this statistic. The probability that the police choose to search suspect one, based on its samples of the suspects, is equal to the probability that 
These two equations will determine the expected number of samples, the expected cost of an investigation, and the probability of a criminal being caught.
28 David Blackwell and M.A. Girshick, Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions, New York: John Wiley (1954) . 29 The solution to this Markov process is fully explained in Shelton M. Ross, Introduction to Probability Models, New York: Academic Press (1980) p. 163. If P(I) is the probability that a is reached before b, where I is the sum of signals, and the probability that I increases by one is u, then P(I)= u*P(I+1) + (1-u)*P(I-1). Using the fact that P(a)=1 and P(b)=0, this Markov process with absorbing barriers can be determined by solving the system of equations generated. The probability of reaching a before b is then specified for all values of I. Set I=0 and the Blackwell equations are the result.
The expected cost of the optimal search procedure will determine whether or not the police start an investigation. Because the sampling costs are constant, if it is optimal to collect the first signal it will always be optimal to collect the next signal, until the decision criterion is reached. Because the loss function has not changed, the police face the same decision in the second period, but with better information. Once the police start to sample, the model predicts a perfect clearance rate for the police. 30 The only way the criminal can escape detection is if the police decide it is too costly to search for him or her .
If the court's warrant requirement is p-where p is the level that the sum of signals must reach before a warrant is issued-then the expected cost of an investigation, before sampling begins, is given by:
The police will begin an investigation if E[C] is less that K(b). If b* is the critical benefit from a crime such that E[C] = K(b*), then for all crimes with b greater that b*, the police will investigate, and for all crimes with b below b*, they will not.
Due to the opportunity costs of committing a crime, the citizen will not commit any crime for which b < O p , regardless of the probability of conviction and the sentence received. The remaining expected cost of a crime is a consequence of the sentence received if caught, the expectation of which will determine whether a citizen commits the crime. In this model, the police have a perfect clearance rate for all crimes they investigate and the police's decision to investigate depends critically upon whether the crime involves a benefit to the offender (assumed to be correlated with the police's objective function) above a critical value b*. Accordingly, the probability that a criminal will be caught depends on the benefits of the crime committed. Crimes with benefits exceeding b* are 30 One complication of the model, which would replace the perfect clearance rate with a much more realistic less-than-perfect clearance rate, would allow for the true evidence to depreciate with time. In that model, during each period the evidence would have a fixed probability of disappearing, as drugs may be flushed away, memories fade, and physical evidence is contaminated. Any time taken by the police in sampling the suspects will increase the probability that the criminal will escape conviction. But this simple twist introduces serious mathematical complications into the model. Since the police will also consider the depreciation of evidence, the expectation of depreciation over time needs to be calculated . This, however, will depend upon the distribution of N, the number of samples before a decision is reached, which is unknown.
certain to be detected accurately (probability of one); crimes with benefits below b* certain not to be detected (probability zero). The crime rate is defined as φ(b*,O p, ,Pc,S) =
, or the proportion of criminal opportunities that are taken.
It is now possible to consider the potential impact of the Supreme Court's Mapp v.
Ohio ruling on police investigation decisions and the eventual crime rates. The ruling may be interpreted as increasing the probable cause requirement imposed upon the police by the judicial system. This will increase the bounds for the police's optimal stopping rule and will increase the expected cost of an investigation. Therefore, this economic model of the search warrant process predicts that the Supreme Courts decision to heighten the warrant requirement will result in a decrease in the number of investigations undertaken. As the police adapt to the heightened judicial requirements, so to will the criminals respond to the change in police investigations . Thus, contrary to the assumptions underlie the previous empirical research of the Mapp ruling, imposing an exclusionary rule on the states may have increased the crime rates, without revealing a significant number of cases dismissed at trial. Employing two panel data sets, we explore the predictions of this economic model and the Mapp v. Ohio ruling.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS-FIFTY STATES, 1958-67 DATA

A. The Data
The crime data was gathered from the Uniform Crime Reports, which are compiled by the FBI, and was used in many of the earlier studies, primarily because it is the only complete crime data set available from before 1970. 31 This data has several well recognized problems. First, it consists only of reported crimes, meaning both the victim and the police must report the crime to the FBI. Second, the data is not really uniform, as then the fixed effect model with group dummy variables will capture all of this effect, and the regressions will compute unbiased estimates. Similarly, if the severity of punishment changed in a uniform way each year (i.e., in the same way for all the states), then employing period effects in the fixed effect specification will produce unbiased estimates.
But if the criminal sentences otherwise changed, or if the level of punishment was affected by the Mapp ruling, then our regressions may be misspecified and the estimates biased.
We cannot test this with the national data set, but the consistency of results between alternative data sets indicates that it is unlikely to be a problem. Moreover, if penalties do change in response to Mapp, it is likely that they will increase to adjust for the increased cost of solving crimes. If so, then any effect we find of the rule will tend to understate its true magnitude.
B. Model Specifications
The primary model specification for this data set will be a fixed effect model with period and group effects. This model permits the constant term to vary for each of the 48 states, so that many of the differences in crime rates between the states are captured in the constant terms. While we included the various explanatory variables, x it , to capture broad movements in crime, it remains possible that we have failed to include some vital explanatory variable that had a broad and uniform effect on the crime rates of all the states. The introduction of the time-specific dummy variables addresses this concern. The principal model takes the form:
34 Log(CRIME) it = a i +b'x it + g MAPP + e it (1) One additional specification is examined. In the model, the variable Log(POLEXP) is 33 We have access to Isaac Ehrlich's 1960 data, which does include data on probabilities and severity of punishment. This data is available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at www.icpsr.umich.edu. We have rerun Ehrlich's regressions with an additional variable for whether illegal evidence was admissible in the state in 1960. We find that admissibility was not significant in explaining crime rates, holding the probability of capture and conviction constant, but did significantly lower the probability of capture and conviction. (Detailed results available upon request from the authors.) 34 CRIME includes the crime rates for murder, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. Thus, more than likely endogenous and a function of CRIME. Therefore, we examine another specification that takes the form:
Log(CRIME) it = a i + b' x it + g MAPP it + λ Log(POLEXP) it + e it (3) Log(POLEXP) it = α i + β Log(CRIME) it + χ INCOME it + δ MAPP+ d it s.t. COV(e it, d it ) = 0 ∀ i,t
The MAPP variable is a dummy variable that will capture the effect of the Supreme Court's Mapp v Ohio decision. This dummy variable equals 1 if the year is 1962 or later and the state had not previously adopted the exclusionary rule. The explanatory variables in x it are used to hold constant other factors that could account for changes in crime rates.
The criteria for using the data was principally the availability of the state data, and secondarily variables found relevant in previous criminal empirical and theoretical works.
Gary Becker developed the economic analysis of criminal behavior, applying the theory of choice under uncertainty to a criminal's decisions. 35 Becker's rational choice model predicts that citizens will weigh the expected costs of committing a crime against the expected benefits, and will participate in all crimes with a positive expected outcome.
Empirical analysis that attempts to estimate a supply function for criminal behavior must, therefore, find adequate proxies for the expected costs and benefits of committing crimes.
In this study, the variables gathered and introduced as explanatory variables for a state's crime rates are similar to those used by Isaac Ehrlich, whose pioneering empirical work verified that regression analysis and the rational choice model are useful tools in the analysis of criminal behavior. 36 Generally, the explanatory variables attempt to capture the expected costs of committing the crime and the expected benefits from the crime. The expected costs include the opportunity costs of lost wages, reputation, social standing, and future employment. These variables have long been recognized as being as important as the more obvious explicit cost of committing a crime: the sentence received, adjusted for for each specification developed, we will perform six separate regressions. the probability of being caught and convicted. 37 The data gathered to analyze the impact of Mapp v. Ohio on crime rates includes several of the standard proxies for these theoretical explanatory variables. The variables (defined in Table 2 ) include state police expenditure, unemployment rates, personal incomes, education levels, percentage of the population living within an urban setting, population age, and racial distributions. These variables are proxies for the probability of being caught, the opportunity cost of committing a crime, and the benefits from committing a crime.
C. Empirical Results
We begin our analysis with the state data gathered from 1958-67 to test the impact of exogenous changes in criminal procedure on state crime levels. With this data set, only the impact of Mapp v. Ohio is investigated. 38 Crime rates were broken down by the type of offense, which allows the analysis to consider the effect of Mapp upon different types of criminal activity. (Table 3 provides the FBI definition of the six crime types. ) Table 4 shows the results using a fixed effect model with group and period effects, which, we believe, is the best specification. Eight variables were included to explain the changes in crime rates for the decade surrounding the introduction of the exclusionary rule in 1961.
Becker's rational choice model predicts the following signs for each variable:
Log(PolExp), negative; Per18-20, positive; Employ, negative; PerWhite, negative;
UpperEd, negative; Urban, no prediction; Rincome, positive.
In addition to the eight variables shown, 48 dummy variables were introduced to sweep the fixed state effects from the model. These dummy variables capture all of the interstate differences in crime due to constant differences between the states. For example, it is likely that the average temperature may account for some of the differences in murder rates between Vermont and Alabama. This difference is swept from the analysis by the group dummy variable, along with all other fixed state effects, such as the statutory required punishment or the level of corruption in the police precincts.
To supplement these group effects, the specification for The results are presented in Table 5 . The significance of MAPP dropped slightly for some of the crime types, but the analysis and results are not dramatically different than the results from the single-equation specification.
The empirical findings from this analysis support the main prediction of the economic model of the search warrant process: that forcing states to adopt an exclusionary rule will have a detrimental impact on crime rates. We estimate with this data set that the exact magnitude of that effect, from 1961 to 1967, ranged from 3% for larceny crimes to 16% for assault. 39 To test the robustness of these results, several specifications were examined. These included the ordinary least squares results with no fixed or period effects, a fixed effect model with only group effects, a random effect model with only group effects, and a random effect model with both group and period effects. The random effects model produced nearly identical estimates as its fixed effect counterpart . OLS without group effect detected substantially larger effects from the Mapp v. Ohio ruling, but this may be due to endogenity bias that is corrected by the fixed effect model. Specification tests rejected the nonlogarithmic specification in favor of the logarithmic specification. 40 The variables (defined in Table 6 ) available for some 42 of the years in this data set are:
-Crime rates for murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, theft, auto theft, The principal specification for this data set is the fixed effect model with group and period effects and will take the form:
Log(CRIME) it = a i + t t + b'x it + g MAPP + e it (
The explanatory variables will include two new dummy variables: MappBurb, MappCity.
MappBurb and MappCity attempt to determine if the Court's 1961 ruling had a different effect on highly populated cities than on smaller cities. A second specification we examine takes the form:
Log(CRIME) it = a i + t t + b'x it + g' t t ×MAPP + e it
This specification permits the effect of MAPP to change over time. Examination of the vector of estimates, g', will reveal the short-run and long-run impact of the Supreme Court's Mapp ruling.
C. Empirical Results: Mapp
The general results from the first data set carry through to this larger data set, with one interesting new observation: the exclusionary rule had a dramatically different effect on large urban cities than on smaller cities. These results are somewhat counterintuitive and unexpected. The effect on smaller cities was larger for almost every offense type.
The only exception was assault; the Mapp ruling appeared to have an equally positive impact on assault rates in the smaller as in larger cities. One might expect that the smaller cities with lower crime rates would not be as significantly burdened by the heightened warrant requirement. But the data clearly says otherwise. The results are presented in Table 7 . Included in Table 7 is the test statistic used to determine if the difference in the MAPP coefficients (MappBurb v. MappCity) is statistically significant. For all crime types other than assault, the Mapp ruling had a significantly lower effect in urban cities than in smaller suburban cities. The regression results show a tremendous impact in smaller cities, an effect that would be masked in the aggregated state data results due to the dominance of the larger urban cities.
43
In addition to exploring the possibility that Mapp has a different effect on smaller cities than on urban cities, we use this larger disaggregated data set to explore the longterm versus short-term effect of Mapp. Two alternative hypotheses are explored. It is 43 As with the state data set, multiple specifications were examined with the city data set. These included a multiple equation specification, random effects model with period and group effects, and fixed and random effects with only group effects, all computed with the single equation and multiple equation specification. The results from Table 6 are representative of the results from all of these different specifications; the Mapp ruling was found to increase crime rates in those states that did not already exclude tainted evidence, and the effect was more pronounced in smaller cities. chose not to provide counsel to these defendants. The regression results, provided in Tables 10 and 11 , suggest that robbery and assaults dramatically increased following the Gideon ruling, with a larger and more significant increase in suburban cities than in urban cities. One puzzling phenomenon was observed-a decrease in burglaries in smaller cities.
One might question why Gideon would have had such a dramatic impact on crime rates.
The answer is simple-in some states, Gideon was applied retroactively. This meant that criminals currently incarcerated without having counsel present were eligible for a new trial. In Florida, the state that convicted Clarence Earl Gideon for breaking and entering, 1,976 prisoners were released outright and another 500 were back in court by January 1,
1964
. 49 This mass release of indigent men (who could not afford an attorney) with a disposition for committing crimes could alone be responsible for the observed increase in crime following the Gideon ruling.
The analysis of Miranda tends to support the conclusion that this surprising Supreme Court decision seriously hampered police investigation techniques. Professor
Cassell previously examined the impact of Miranda on national clearance rates and discovered a dramatic decrease in confessions after 1966. 50 The results of the regressions are provided in Tables 12 and 13 . The fixed effect model, without period effects, estimates that by hampering police investigations, the Supreme Court may have increased total crime rates by 11% with its Miranda ruling.
VI. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
When the Supreme Court decided to enact a universal exclusionary rule, it did not explicitly discuss the impact that rule would have upon the crime rates in the affected states. Although the Court may have understood that an effect was possible, the Justices needed to decide if one method of enforcement was required as the sole remedy capable of protecting our Fourth Amendment rights. To decide this, it may have been helpful to understand the effect of the rule on society, but this may not have altered their decision.
The Court argued that the exclusionary rule would better protect individuals from unauthorized intrusion by government officials and probably would have concluded that 49 ANTHONY LEWIS, Gideon 's Trumpet, p. 215 (1964) . 50 See Cassell, supra note 7.
the benefits to society outweighed the costs from higher crime rates. This is especially likely since the Fourth Amendment implicitly places an individual's privacy interest above society's interest in being free from criminal behavior.
The results of our regression analysis, using a variety of data and econometric techniques, supports our theoretical predictions-namely that forcing police to looklisten-and-wait before searching suspected criminals will have a dramatic impact on police investigation techniques and eventually on crime rates. Both the state data and the city data support this conclusion. And while the effect of Mapp on murder rates is ambiguous, the effect on other offense types is not. The imposition of the exclusionary rule by the Supreme Court on states unwilling to self-select that remedy has proven to have a predictably adverse impact on crime rates.
The data also indicates that two other controversial Supreme Court rulings,
Gideon and Miranda, caused detectable increases in crimes rates. The effect of Gideon on assault and robbery crimes may have been due to the release of thousands of indigent criminals, rather than to the effect of providing counsel at trial. The Miranda ruling, which further limited the investigation techniques of police, is correlated with an 11% increase in total crimes and a nearly 33% increase in violent crimes.
More surprisingly, the Wolf v. Colorado decision appeared to have an impact on crime as well. While not as controversial a decision (although it was overturned by the Mapp ruling), the Wolf decision did sanction the use of unlawfully obtained evidence at trial by state courts. If prior to Wolf, the state courts were concerned over the general movement to apply all of the bill of rights to the states, and the long-standing federal remedy of the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations, they may have hesitated to use tainted evidence, fearing to involve the federal courts. Following Wolf, the Court may have dispelled this concern, spurring additional use of tainted evidence and thus lowering crime rates. The limited empirical analysis that we could perform supports this conclusion.
The analysis of the larger city data set permitted deeper inquiry to differentiate the impact of Mapp on urban and suburban cities. Contrary to our expectation, the data unambiguously illustrates that smaller cities bore the brunt of the Supreme Court's 24 decision. Because every study that examined the impact of Mapp focused only on larger cities, they missed the real effect of the new ruling. In may be that larger cities have greater flexibility and funding to adopt to the new procedures, or had more rigorously imposed the alternative civil sanctions. By only studying crime rates in larger cities, the older studies missed the most dramatic impact of the Mapp ruling.
For proponents of the exclusionary rule, the analysis of the dynamic impac t of the Mapp ruling is disheartening. Proponents have argued that any short-term impact of the exclusionary rule would quickly dissipate as police adopted to the rule and began to discover other ways to catch criminals. But the data fails to support this seemingly plausible theory. Rather, the long-term impact of the Mapp ruling increased steadily as the decade passed. While police have adopted new police investigation techniques (such as finger-printing and ballistics analysis) these new techniques, if anything, make losing tangible property due to the exclusionary rule even more costly. Not until more recently did the Court revoke Fourth Amendment habeous petitions, 51 enact the good-faith exception, 52 and shift the general Fourth Amendment law away from a warrant requirement and back towards a reasonableness standard. 53 Our empirical analysis suggests that such steps to relax the warrant requirements will lower crime rates.
VII. CONCLUSION
This analysis cannot be used to show that the exclusionary r ule should be replaced, or that the "good faith" doctrine should be used, or that the Supreme Court was incorrect in its decision. Rather, this is a positive analysis of a radical change in criminal procedure conducted to test currently held beliefs. At no time have we attempted to quantify the other costs of the exclusionary rule, which include the time spent on motions to suppress, the number of guilty suspects that escape conviction, and the decrease in police productivity as they alter their allocation of resources. More importantly, we do not 
